The Retreat to Gazala (part 2)

21st Jan - 4 Feb 1942

The 21st of January 1942 dawned brightly as I made my way to the cipher office in Barce blissfully unaware of events taking place at Rommel’s base at El Agheila. Cipher traffic was quite heavy with the information that Rommel was on the move. ‘A recce in force’ said 8th Army. This was quickly disproved as the enemy advanced along the coast road surprising and quickly sweeping aside patrols of 200th Guards Brigade.

Our 5 Bde was immediately recalled from Derna. Such was the shortage of transport only one Battalionn. could move forward! The latest Sitrep revealed the Afrika Korps were fanning out over the desert south of the Jebel and up the coast road towards Benghazi.

The following day Rommel had taken Antelat and Saunu. XIII Corps HQ hastily moved back 45 miles to clear the way for the impending battle.

On the 23rd in a call for ‘action stations’ Main Div HQ moved back to Benghazi and 7 Bde took up positions 12 miles south of the town. 5 Bde blocked two passes into the Jebel and 11 Bde ordered up from Tobruk. But our efforts were dependent on the support of 1st Armd Div. who were now en- countering German panzers for the first time.

By the 25th 1st Armd was badly mauled and in no position to halt Rommel’s advance. Original plans were changed. An almighty Flap reigned supreme!

XIII Corps correctly gave orders for the evacuation of Benghazi. We at Rear HQ received orders to fall back to the Lamluda crossroads. In showery weather we retraced our march back through the Jebel. Sitting in the back of an open PU truck I got steadily wetter and more disheartened.

We were taken out of command of XIII Corps and put under direct control of 8th Army. Gen. Ritchie, ever optimistic, saw Rommell's advance as merely a foray and not an all-out offensive. He was adamant that only Italian infantry were facing the Division’s front south of Benghazi. He counter-manded the order to evacuate Benghazi, giving rise to discord between himself on one hand and XIII Corps Comdr. and Gen. Tuker on the other. So we drove back the 90 odd miles to Barce. In teeming rain we shuttled back and forth like Yo-yos that I wished Ritchie would make up his mind!

On January 28th 7 Bde found German forces on the rough track of the Jebel and 21 Panzer Div and 90 Light Div. advancing up the coast road towards Benghazi. Unless checked they would reach the town within a few hours. When asked for the whereabouts of 1st Armd Div, Ritchie said he had dispatched them to deal with a weak enemy force advancing on Mekili. He had fallen for Rommel’s feint move and this now left 4th Indian Div completely unprotected against Rommel's panzers.

Another Flap swept through the Division. How to escape the trap and encirclement. All base formations and the RAF moved out. Benghazi lay under a pall of smoke as supplies were destroyed.

At 3.3O pm Main Div. left for Barce and we left once again for the Lamluda crossroads. This time we knew we would not be going back. We were welcomed at Lamluda by machine-gun fire from a lone JU88. It was 1.3Oam before I bedded down for the night.

Meanwhile the strength of 1st Armd Div. was down to 22 runners! What a way to run a war. Would no one heed past desert history and profit by earlier mistakes? Was 8th Army Command blind to Rommel’s moves which he had made before? In my heart I now had serious doubts that we would ever win this war unless we had a British General equal to Romel. We were not good enough. The Germans were the professionals - we the amateurs!

7 Bde found themselves cut off in the Jebel surrounded by the Afrika Korps. Radio silence descended on Div HQs as all wireless communication from the Brigade ceased. It was a bleak moment for all of us. General Auchenlech had flown up from Cairo to oversee operations. I was still at Lamluda crossroads when the decision was made to split us up into two sections. Operational with radio and ciphers - all others to move east to the desert. In the hurry to move I was left without food.

On the 30th January we received wonderful news that 7 Brigade had broken out of the German ring by going south right through their lines into the open desert beyond. All Admin vehicles were ordered to leave the Jebel and make for the desert as far east as El Adem. Operational section to reach Martuba south of Derna. We moved back along the familiar coast road being bombed and straffed on the way; no damage done. On reaching Martuba airfield we leagured for two days listening to the despondent sounds of demolition explosions from the Derna airfields. Despite road demolitions the Germans swiftly advanced through the Jebel where the first clashes took place on both roads held by 5 & 7 Brigades.

The 1st February saw Romnel’s forces in the south by-passing Mekili and by moving northwards were quickly approaching the broken ground of the Jebel where a desert trail led to Martuba 40 miles distant and 50 miles to Derna. The whole of 4th Indian Division was now in danger of being trapped. Five bombs were dropped on our area and with Rommel less than 40 miles away we packed up and by 2pm moved rapidly eastwards in another Flap!

To enable the RAF to distinguish our vehicles from those of the enemy, who were using captured British vehicles, RAF red, white and blue roundels were to be painted on the bonnet or cab roof of all 8th Army’s lorries.

After leaving Martuba we had no more bombing incidents. Transport streamed passed us all day heading for the rear areas. I found moving back eastwards a bitter pill to swallow after the struggle of the past few months. All our work, the deprivation of desert life, the lack of water and the accompanying misery had all been in vain. We would have to go through the same experience a second time.

By the 2nd February General Ritchie agreed to an evacuation of the Jebel, but it had to be timed with 1st Armd Division’s withdrawal. He was still optimistic that Rommel had over-reached himself. He hadn’t grasped the tight schedule he had set for 4 Ind. Div’s withdrawal. Our small group moved yet again for the vicinity of Gazala aerodrome in the desert. We left the Jebel by plunging down a sloping gradient among boulders, tree's and bushes until we reached the desert floor.

In a matter of minutes we found ourselves back on the desert with all its discomforts. A sandstorm blew up engulfing us in its yellow gloom - but it was more like home to me. The Jebel had seemed unreal, too good to be true; a freak of nature in a land of deserts.

Meanwhile 5 Bde completed the withdrawal from Derna and headed for Tmimi near the Gazala inlet. This move enabled 11 Bde to leave the Jebel and escape the German trap.

Lt.General Godwin-Austen Comdr XIII Corps asked to be relieved of his command, claiming that Gen. Ritchie had shown lack of confidence in him during events leading up to the evacuation of the Jebel. ‘Straffer’ Gott took over command of XIII Corps in his place.

On 3rd February 5 and 11 Brigades reached Tmimi and moved to complete the withdrawal to the Gazala Line. Late in the afternoon my small group rejoined Rear Div. HQ on the rocky escarpment overlooking El Adem aerodrome. I asked myself, “Had’Crusader’ been all in vain?”

The 4th of February saw the establishment of the Gazala Line from which the Germans had retreated on 17th December last year. Here the German advance petered out and finally stopped. Equilibrium had been reached on both sides. Stalemate had once again been attained. What we needed in future was better equipment and a firmer control at the top. Given these there was no reason why we should not beat our German opposite at his own game!

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